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ERS Group
economists are among the world’s
leading authorities on auction theory and practice. Our
professional staff and academic affiliates have advised
governments and firms worldwide on the design of auctions
for telecommunications licenses, electricity, mineral rights, and
other assets. We are on the cutting edge of research in
this field and offer clients specialized insights
regarding
complex auction design and bidding issues.
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Auction design
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Auction simulation
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Bidding strategy and support
- Game
theory analysis
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ERS Group Provides Bidding Support in Swiss Spectrum Auction
ERS Group auction experts were retained to assist a bidder in developing a bidding strategy for use in electromagnetic spectrum license auctions held in Switzerland. Our analysis identified alternative bidding scenarios and competitors, provided an assessment of the competition, examined implications of bidder asymmetries, and implemented practice games.
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ERS Group Reviews FERC Auction Proposal for Pipeline Capacity
On behalf of a major interstate pipeline, ERS Group Special Consultant R. Preston McAfee and Academic Affiliate Charles Plott submitted a statement to the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in response to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning a proposed auction of pipeline capacity. Professors McAfee and Plott concluded the proposal raised a number of difficult auction issues that had not been resolved either theoretically or experimentally by experts in auction design. Although the use of capacity auctions has promise for improving the performance of the natural gas industry, the ERS Group experts recommended to the FERC that it should proceed cautiously and avoid the creation of a deficient auction mechanism. The FERC agreed and chose not to implement the proposed auction.
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ERS Group Special Consultant R. Preston McAfee Assists in Design of Mexican Spectrum Auction
ERS Group Special Consultant R. Preston McAfee assisted The Commission Federal de Telecomunicaciones (COFETEL), the Mexican telecommunications agency, in its design of spectrum licenses. COFETEL was interested in an auction design that would be understandable to administrators and bidders, transparent and able to withstand public scrutiny, and completed in a short time period. The auction design developed by Professor McAfee and a team of auction experts was considered an important success and was successfully employed in sales generating more than $1.1 billion.
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ERS Group Assists in Design of Auction for Mexican Mineral Rights
ERS Group Special Consultant R. Preston McAfee provided advice to Mexico’s Ministry of Commerce in the design of auctions to privatize that country's gold, silver, and phosphate mines. Among the issues considered were the use of sealed versus open bids, the establishment of minimum bids, and an installment payment scheme.
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ERS Group Special Consultant R. Preston McAfee Designs Auction Used in $20 Billion Sale of Spectrum Licenses by FCC
ERS Group Special Consultant R. Preston McAfee was a co-inventor (with Professors Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson) of the simultaneous ascending auction adopted by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as its primary auction mechanism used for the sale of more than $20 billion of electromagnetic spectrum licenses. An ERS Group Economist advised the FCC in its early application of spectrum auctions.
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R. Preston McAfee
(2002).
The Strategist's Toolkit
Princeton University Press.
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John McMillan
(2002).
Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets
W.W. Norton & Company.
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John McMillan
(1992).
Games, Strategies, and Managers
Oxford University Press.
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R. Preston McAfee, Daniel Vincent, and Wendy Takacs
(1999).
Tarrifying Auctions.
Rand Journal of Economics
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Simon J. Wilkie
(1996).
Installment Payments and the FCC Spectrum Auctions.
Jobs and Capital
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Simon J. Wilkie and Bhaskar Chakravorti
(1995).
Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Radio Spectrum.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
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